Robert McNamara, et al.: “U.
S. Military Victory in Vietnam: A Dangerous Illusion?” Chapter 7 from Argument Without End: In Search
of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy
The introduction of this article was written by
Robert McNamara, Secretary of State from 1961 - 1968. Colonel Herbert Schandler, a Vietnam veteran whose doctoral
studies focused on the war, wrote the text and conclusion. McNamara asked Schandler to write a review
of military policy and operations in Vietnam.
In particular, he asked Schandler the following question: Could the
United States have won the war militarily at acceptable cost and risk?
Other questions Schandler was asked to address
include: Could or should the South Vietnamese win the war themselves? How effective were the U.S. military
tactics, including the bombing campaign in the north? How effective was the U.S. strategy of attrition?
A. The illusion – The U.S. military was denied a
victory because of constraints by Washington.
B. Reality – This was a “people’s war,” not a war of
northern aggression. It was a civil
war. The U.S. ignored the social nature
of the war, which the North Vietnamese and southern allies understood well.
A. General Edward Lansdale recommended counterinsurgency
measures to meet the guerilla threat (“southern insurgency”) in January
1961. These measures were approved by
Kennedy.
B. The strategic hamlet program was designed to
develop support among the rural populations for the Saigon government. Instead, the villagers viewed the hamlets as
another program by the corrupt Saigon government. This, in turn, made it easier for the communists and Vietcong to
infiltrate the countryside.
C. The South Vietnamese army was ineffective – Saigon
leadership was unable to win loyalty of South Vietnamese people and, therefore,
its survival depended on U.S. military, political and economic support
A. Saigon’s poor performance led to more communist
advances;
B. Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 led to first
U.S. reprisal with congressional resolution of support
C. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended air strikes in the North and,
specifically, the Ho Chi Minh Trail;
D. Missed opportunity to fundamentally reassess the
American commitment to the fatally flawed government in South Vietnam
A. In February 1965, NLF raids against U.S. advisers’ barracks
and an American helicopter base near Pleiku prompted the air strikes –
transformed the war into a U.S. war against North Vietnam and its southern
allies.
B. Air strikes from 1965 – 1967:
i. Limited bombing with weekly targets was approved
ii. Concern about Chinese and Soviet response
iii. Joint Chiefs opposed to gradual and limited bombing
campaign, but World War II tactics ineffective in Vietnam because of limited
targets
iv. Repeated requests by Joint Chiefs to lift bombing
restrictions even though U.S. intelligence revealed that airpower would be
ineffective
v. North Vietnam’s adaptability and resourcefulness
were greatly underestimated – no long-term impact on supply lines
C. Reasons for failure:
i.
Agricultural country with few industrial targets –
minimal impact on economy
·
North Vietnam’s armed forces placed little reliance
on the domestic economy for war material (other than manpower)
ii.
Supply needs did not match conventional war
criteria used to justify the bombings
iii. Blind faith in bombings ignored the true nature of
the war – a revolutionary conflict, not a struggle between industrialized
powers
iv. Hanoi leaders had prepared its citizens for
bombings – oil and other commodities were dispersed, school children had
foxholes under their desks, bomb shelters everywhere
v. Aid from socialist countries
vi. Hanoi government was effective in using the
bombings to mobilize people behind the communist war effort.
A. US Marines landed at Da Nang in March 1965 – first
time that an organized ground unit had been committed
B. Johnson approved additional forces in April 1965 –
marked the president’s acceptance of concept that U.S. ground forces could
engage in ground operations
·
Defensive strategy was inconsistent with military
training
C. General
Westmoreland presented offensive plan with three phases and was given authority
in June 1965 to commit U.S. ground forces anywhere to strengthen South
Vietnamese forces – liberated from restrictions of defensive mission
·
Phase 1 – 175,000 troops (Johnson approved)
·
Phase 2 – additional 100,000 troops (decision
deferred)
·
Phase 3 – unspecified additional reinforcements
(decision deferred)
·
Authority to call up 235,000 reservists (Johnson
refused)
VI. End of the illusion of victory in Vietnam
A. Strategy of attrition failed because the North
Vietnamese were willing to take casualties at an alarming rate without giving
up the fight – 300 U.S. troops lost in Ia Drang as compared to 1,300 North
Vietnamese
B. Tet Offensive in January 1968 exposed the illusion
of military victory:
i. U.S. and South Vietnamese didn’t believe the action
would come during Tet
ii.
U.S. command failed to anticipate the scope and
intensity of the NLF attacks
C. Joint Chiefs saw opportunity to finally obtain the
number of troops they thought necessary to achieve their military victory, however....
D. Johnson announces in March 1968:
i.
Only token increase in American forces
ii.
Expansion and improvement of South Vietnamese
forces is first priority
iii.
Halt bombing north of 20th parallel
iv.
Would not accept nomination for another term as
president
E. Johnson’s speech brought U.S. commitment and
strategy in Vietnam into line with political objectives and constraints, which
had been misunderstood and resented by his military advisors – end of the
illusion of victory in Vietnam
F. Johnson’s speech also put the South Vietnamese
government on notice that U.S. aid could not be taken for granted
1. How did the shortcomings of the South Vietnamese
government impact the U.S. political and military strategy?
2. Why were the North Vietnamese leaders more
effective in gaining the support of the South Vietnamese people?
3. Were U.S. concerns about Soviet and Chinese
retaliation exaggerated?