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Count Otto von Bismarck was unmistakably a Prussian
aristocrat and had welcomed the failure of both the Assembly of 1848-9 and
also a subsequent "Erfurt Union" of 1850 in resolving German questions,
as, had they succeeded, the Prussia that was most dear to Bismarck's heart
would have been no more.
" We all wish that the Prussian
eagle should spread out its wings as guardian and ruler from Munich to the
Donnersberg, but free we will have him, not bound by a new Regensburg
Diet. Prussians we are and Prussians we will remain"
The
possibility of Habsburg Austria gaining more influence in the Germanic
Confederation, to Prussia's detriment, was very much to the front of
Bismarck's mind. He had entered political life almost by accident, having
been deputised in the place of another who had been taken ill. Originally
prepared to respect Austria, as a champion of conservatism, he had come to
view Austria as being a dedicated rival of Prussia with this rivalry only
being open to being resolved to Prussia's advantage by the humbling of
Austrian claims to predominance in the affairs of the German
Confederation.
Throughout his career, subsequent to his
coming to resent Austria, Bismarck devoted his considerable efforts to
performing several difficult tasks including that of the exclusion of
Austria, ( as being Prussia's rival ), from German affairs and that of the
preserving of the Prussian tradition from being eroded by the effects of
both Nationalism and Democratisation.
In September 1862
Bismarck was called upon by King Wilhelm I during a crisis where the
Prussian Landtag, or lower parliamentary house, was refusing to approve
increased military spending. Within days of taking up office Bismarck went
perhaps further than he his better judgement might have intended in
asserting that:-
The position of Prussia in Germany will
not be determined by its liberalism but by its power ... Prussia must
concentrate its strength and hold it for the favourable moment, which has
already come and gone several times. Since the treaties of Vienna, our
frontiers have been ill-designed for a healthy body politic. Not through
speeches and majority decisions will the great questions of the day be
decided - that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849 - but by blood and
iron
As Minister-President of Prussia Bismarck arranged
things such that the increase in the size of the army took place despite
the opposition of the Landtag. The existing practices of the Prussian
state allowed Bismarck to continue in office provided the King was willing
to remain favourable to his ministry.
In January 1863 the
Poles again attempted to forcefully win concessions of change from a
reluctant Tsar-King. Russia regarded the retention of Poland as a
principal aim of policy. Whilst several western states lost the Tsar's
good opinion by offering moral support to the Poles, an offer of
assistance to Russia made by Bismarck, that was initially thought
presumptuous, left an abiding impression with Russia that Prussia was a
state that it should view with favour.
Russia was to take
some time to recover from this expense of resources in what proved to be
protracted efforts to retain control over Poland.
In 1863
Franz Joseph, Emperor of Austria, proposed that a reform of the Germanic
Confederation be discussed by the German Princes in a meeting to be held
that autumn in Frankfurt. Franz Joseph urged agreement between the Princes
of Germany as the best way of containing the revolutionary tide of
liberalism, democratisation and socialism.
In order to prevent the
formulation an agreed approach to the reform of the Confederation Bismarck
went to very great lengths, even to the point of reducing the King to
tears and himself to nervous exhaustion, in order to persuade the King of
Prussia, very much against his own inclination, not to attend. Austria had
a preponderance of influence in the Confederation and any agreed reform
would probably have been broadly favourable to the Austrian interest. With
the abscence of Prussia, which was, after Austria herself, inherently the
second most powerful state in the confederation, nothing could be fully
decided upon.
The Emperor of Austria also had domestic troubles to
contend with during these times. A so-called February Patent of 1861 had
instituted a limited form of parliamentism that was supported mainly by
Germanic "liberals" who were comfortable with an autocratic centralism
effectively run by the Germans of the Empire largely in the interests of
those same Germans. The parliament was largely boycotted by the Magyars,
Poles and Czechs who felt themselves to be excluded from real power and
representation.
Schleswig and Holstein again loomed to the
forefront of European affairs in that the resolution internationally
agreed after the difficulties that become critical in 1848 was breaking
down. That resolution had envisaged these territories remaining separate
from Denmark, but with the Danish King being Duke of Holstein and Duke of
Schleswig. Holstein was predominantly peopled by Germans, whilst Schleswig
had a German majority in its southern areas. In 1863 the Danish King moved
to break the traditionally recognised link between the two Duchies and to
incorporate Schleswig fully into Denmark. In November 1863 the demise of
the then King of Denmark allowed a new succession issue to further
complicate an issue which Bismarck fully intended to exploit to Prussia's
advantage.
Although the Diet of the German Confederation
authorised the sending of federal forces to intervene in the Duchies.
Bismarck preferred that such an intervention should be undertaken by
Prussia and Austria. Bismarck was able to characterise this intervention
as being undertaken in support of existing treaties. A so-called Danish
War ensued and by February 1864 both Schleswig and Holstein had
substantially fallen to Prussian and Austrian forces and a conference of
Vienna of October assigned Schleswig, Holstein, and a small territory of
Lauenberg to joint Prussian and Austrian control.
Bismarck was not
alone, in these times, in hoping to take measures, broadly exploitative of
populist sentiment, that would enhance the position of a German
Kingdom.
In January 1864 Odo Russell, nephew of the British Foreign
Secretary and a quasi-official British representative in Rome, in a
private audience with the Pope was told that:-
"The example of
Italy (i.e. where the House of Savoy was annexing, with local popular
consent, the territories of other Princes) will be the ruin of the
smaller Princes of Germany and I think very ill of the condition of that
country. Each of the smaller sovereigns hopes to aggrandise his Kingdom at
the expense of his neighbour and all will be swept away like the Grand
Dukes of Tuscany, Modena and Parma were in Italy. The King of Bavaria was
here and I did what I could to convince him that he was running great
risks but he could not see it. His idea is that the House of Wittlesbach
should be as powerful as the Houses of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, and if
he had his own way he would begin by annexing Baden and Würtemberg to
Bavaria."
The situation within the lands of the Habsburgs
where the parliament, as elected under restricted rules of suffrage, was
particularly supported by the Germans of Austria, of Bohemia, and of
Moravia, and was largely boycotted by other nationalities was not entirely
as Emperor Franz Joseph would wish and after some consideration, and
against the advice of most of his his ministers, he responded positively
to an article published in the spring of 1865 by the prominent Magyar
liberal, Ferenc Deak, that outlined conditions under which the inherently
powerful Magyars would find it possible to co-operate more fully with his
own exercise of sovereignty. These conditions amounted to a restoration of
the Hungarian constitution of 1848 and the virtual establishment of two
distict states - one largely German-Austrian and one largely Magyar - that
would co-operate fully and that would together function towards the
outside world as a single power.
Relations between Prussia and
Austria over the Schleswig Holstein issue were strained by Prussia making
it known that she wished to develop Kiel as a major naval base. A
convention of Gastein of August 1865 recognised Holstein as being under
the control of Austria whilst Schleswig and Lauenberg were to be
controlled by Prussia.
This conflict over Schleswig and
Holstein featured an early example of the powers proposing that an
eventual settlement should be consistent with the nationality of the
person's affected rather than on dynastic claims or treaties. Holstein and
southern Schleswig were preponderantly Germanic by population whilst Danes
were in the majority in northern Schleswig.
Austria had reason to
believe that Prussia was still not satisfied in relation to Holstein and
that Italy was not satisfied in relation to Venetia. In September Bismarck
secretly sounded out Napoleon III at Biarritz as to his possible reaction
to an open conflict between Prussia and Austria. In November Austria
received offers of very substantial sums from Italy, if Venetia would be
transferred to Italian control, and from Prussia, if Holstein would be
transferred to Prussian control. Austria declined both these offers
probably deeming it dishonourable for any dynastic state to sell off
territories.
In late December 1865 Prussia and Italy entered into
a commercial treaty and in January King Victor Emmanuel was invested with
the Prussian Order of the Black Eagle. Bismarck continued to work
towards securing the Prussian King's permission to enter into a formal
military alliance with Italy that would prejudicial to the Austrian
interest. It was contrary to the basic principles of the Germanic
Confederation that any member would ally with an outside power against any
other member of the Confederation. The fact that Prussia intended to
secretly ally with Italy shows the seriousness with which Bismarck was
pursuing his own version of reform of the Confederation.
In these
times Bismarck advised Benedetti, Prussian ambassador to France that:-
"I have succeeded in persuading the King of Prussia to break
off the intimate relations of his House with the Imperial House of
Austria; to make an alliance with revolutionary Italy; to make
arrangements for a possible emergency, with the French Emperor; and to
propose at Frankfurt the revision of the Federal Act by a popular
parliament. I am proud of my success. I do not know whether I shall be
allowed to reap what I have sown; but, even if the King deserts me, I
have prepared the way by deepening the rift between Prussia and Austria,
and the liberals, if they come to power, will complete my work."
The alliance between Prussia and Italy was finalised in April
and promised Venetia to Italy in return for her participation in a war
against the Austrian Empire. The alliance was to hold for only three
months. Within days of the Italian alliance having been concluded Bismarck
challenged Austria by having the Prussian delegate to the Confederal Diet
propose reforms of the Confederation that would be deeply prejudicial to
the Austrian interest and also voicing complaints about the way the
Austrian administration of Holstein was being conducted. Austrian
diplomacy, meanwhile, indulged in some provocations of Prussia. A Prussian
force was sent into Holstein on Bismarck's orders. A "Six Weeks War"
between Austria and Prussia ensued in which the Prussian interest
convincingly prevailed. Bismarck restrained the forces of Prussia and her
allies from making too many claims on an humbled Austria. Bismarck
considered that it was in Prussia's interest that Austria, although
excluded from German affairs in the West, should nonetheless be allowed an
opportunity to re-establish herself as a power to the east. Should
Habsburg Austria be critically damaged it was an open question as to what
settlement would spring up in its place. Bismarck also considered that
Austria, although somewhat humbled in these disputations, could be a
possible diplomatic and military ally in the future.
The conflicts with Denmark over
Schleswig-Holstein and between Austria and Prussia are sometimes referred
to as "Wars of German Unification" but they were at that time more truly
"Wars of Prussian Consolidation". In the wake of these two availing
conflicts that had been, in large part, subtly fomented by Bismarck as the
champion of "traditional Prussia", and which led to the formation of a
North German Confederation in 1867, the Landtag was encouraged to bestow
retrospective immunity on Bismarck's unconstitutional acts.
In the
wake of the defeat in the "Six Weeks War" the Austrian Emperor, whose
position had been weakened thereby, agreed a Compromise (Augsgleich) with
the Magyars that re-established the Austrian Empire as Austro-Hungary - an
Imperial and Royal "Dual Monarchy" comprised of an Austrian Empire and an
Hungarian Kingdom - under a single monarch. From these times the Austrian
aspect of this state developed along lines that showed a preparedness to
be somewhat liberal in accomodating its powerful minority peoples -
Czechs, Poles, Italians, etc. whilst within the Hungarian Kingdom the
Magyars tended to moreso insist on cultural assimilation of the numerous
Slav minorities domiciled in the "lands of the Crown of St. Stephen" but
offered social and civic concessions to those who assimilated themselves
to an officially Magyar state. The Magyars thus gained a substantial
independence whilst retaining assurance that their King would seek to
defend the Hungarian Kingdom with Austrian as well as Hungarian resources.
Prussia had long hoped to be dominant in the Germanies
north of the river Main, this was now achieved but a groundswell of
Germanic sentiment supported the establishment of a more territorially
extensive German nation state. Bismarck was reluctantly open to achieving
yet more expansions of the territory of Prussia-Germany. In strategic
terms the France of Napoleon III was the presumptive opponent of the
annexation, by the Prussian dominated North German Confederation, of the
states of Southern Germany.
The rivalry of France was in one
most important respect to the advantage of Bismarck's expansionary
policies. There was a tradition of rivalry and cultural misunderstanding
between north and south Germany. That being said there was also a more
intense tradition of rivalry between German Europe and French Europe. In
the nineteenth century alone Germany had fought a "War of Liberation"
against Napoleon in 1813, whilst in 1840 there was a crisis, which blew
over, featuring widespread, and popularly supported, German alarm when it
appeared that the French intended to seize territories south of the Rhine.
Bismarck hoped to exploit German rivalry vis a vis France to precipitate
co-operation and solidarity between north and south Germany and also
increase acceptance of the Prussian dynasty.
In these times
Napoleon III of France had more or less hinted to Bismarck that in return
for French neutrality at the time of the recent Austro-Prussian war France
should expect "Compensations". France had remained neutral, largely out of
the belief that the war would be more protracted and expensive of lives
and resources than it had been. Napoleon III seemed to anticipate that the
position of France would have been relatively enhanced by the exhaustion
of Austria and Prussia. France hoped that a third Germany, apart from
Austria and Prussia, could be formed based on the South German states. The
unexpectedly brief conflict, and decisive outcome in favour of Prussia,
with no compensating advantage to France, meant that France, formerly the
power of note in Western Europe, had lost much advantage as a result.
Napoleon reminded Bismarck that he expected some sort of
"Compensation".
In efforts to attain this compensation the
French sought part of Belgium but met with British and other opposition,
and then the Palatinate on the Upper Rhine but met with Germanic
opposition. Then the French agreed a compact with the King of Holland
whereby the French could gain Luxembourg by purchase and Bismarck
contributed to the orchestration of popular opposition to the acquisition
of "Germanic" Luxembourg by France. In 1870 Bismarck was again able to
galvanise the opinion of almost all the German lands by producing a draft
Treaty which showed that Napoleon III had been seeking to gain what were
thought of as Germanic lands.
An international situation
resulted from the Spanish being prepared to accept a Hohenzollern, and
cousin, of the King of Prussia as the successor to their vacant throne.
France, which had historical reason to consider itself the foremost power
on the western Europe continent, sought to ensure that this Hohenzollern
candidacy was not merely withdrawn, but was withdrawn in such a way as
making it seem that Prussia had climbed down somewhat under French
pressure. The Hohenzollern candidacy was initially withdrawn without much
appearance of a climb-down but French diplomacy persisted in efforts to
produce such an appearance. It was in these circumstances in 1870 that
Bismarck as Minister-President subtly added Prussian provocations to those
of France by editing a so-called Ems Telegram in order to let it seem that
the French Ambassador had been disrespectfully treated by the Prussian
King. France for her part had been seeking such a contest in which it
hoped to prevail. The French Emperor spoke of entering into this war "with
a light heart". In the event the Prusso-German interest prevailed in this
war and received some support from the states of South
Germany.
The outcomes of an ensuing "Franco-Prussian" War,
which is also referred to as a War of German Unification, included the
formation of a federal German Empire. This "Second German Reich" was
proclaimed after the King of Prussia was persuaded to accept the Imperial
Crown that had been offered by the German Princes. The actual announcement
taking place in the fabulous Hall of Mirrors in the sumptuous palace of
Versailles outside Paris.
Both the short-lived North German
Confederation and the subsequent German Empire functioned under
constitutional arrangements which, whilst including a Federal Parliament,
or Reichstag, elected by universal suffrage, did not concede effective
power to that Reichstag. Authority over the duration of administrations,
central finances, and the armed forces, residing moreso in a Bundesrat of
State delegates dominated by Prussia.
The outcome of the
Wars of German Unification considerably altered the European political
scene. France deplored the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany after the
Franco-Prussian War and Bismarck thereafter strove to diplomatically
isolate France denying her the opportunity of winning back her lost
provinces as an outcome of war. Aside from this limitation on alliances
that might threaten Imperial Germany Bismarck hoped that France would
progress and be reconciled and was prone to encourage her to direct her
energies towards extending sway over parts of North Africa. The German
Empire's establishment inherently presented Europe with the reality of a
populous and industrialising polity possessing a considerable, and
undeniably increasing, economic and diplomatic
presence.
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![[Unification of Germany, Bismarck]](secondGermanEmpire_files/enlightenment.gif)