Wlodzimierz Wesolowski



			Institute of Philosophy and Sociology

				Polish Academy of Sciences





	PARTIES, POLITICAL ACTORS AND PARLIAMENTS IN THE TRANSFORMATION PERIOD

				IN CENTRAL-EAST EUROPE



			     International Conference

		The New Democratic Parliaments: The First Years

			Ljubljana, Slovenia, 73-24 June 1996



An incoherent political landscape



	The variety of approaches that can be observed among Polish politicians leads us to 

believe that there is some disorder in their thinking about politics and political 

institutions. Politicians switch from one theoretical frame of reference to another, from 

one ideological framework to another, they try to combine incompatible ideas into slogans. 

In this paper, however, I would like to say a little bit more. This disorder can hinder the 

processes of democratic development (democratization). I do not believe that what is 

happening in Poland is an inevitable ailment. When we look at the Czech Republic or Hungary, 

we immediately observe that politics in these countries is more orderly.



	On the most general level the situation in Poland may be described as a weak 

institutionalization of the poIiticaI order. This weak institutionahzation has three main 

features:

		unstable political system which not allows for viable structuring of economic 

and political alternatives

		unclear division of prerogatives between state organs (confusing provisional 

constitution is in force)

		intluence of extra-political forces on the political arena

		exceedingly high personal animosities between political leaders and lack of 

commonly accepted "rules of political game"



	There is great intellectual uncertainty about everything being said about the Polish 

political scene, and I am very well aware of that. Although many phenomena appear to be 

dangerous, things may turn out for the better. One may hope for greater coherence and less 

fragmentation. One of the factors operating in a desirable direction is the apparent high 

level of self-criticism found amongst the politicians. Most of them judge their actions as 

inadequate, sometimes as flawed, and as harmful. Naturally, as individuals and political 

parties, they are more eager to notice the mistakes made by their adversaries than those they 

make themselves. Such assessments, nevertheless, do not exclude a high level of awareness of 

deficiencies. This has been documented by researches on the most prominent Ml% and leaders of 

political parties, amongst others. (Wesolowski and Pankow, 1995). That research will be 

referred to in this paper.



	I shall begin by outlining a broader background. That will enable me to grasp the 

proportions in the deficiencies of the political scene present among all those difficulties 

which are encountered in the process of systemic transformations from communism to a 

privately-owned market economy and democratic political Central and Eastern system. At the 

outset of transformation, the entire area of Europe lived in a state of euphoria and trust in 

the speedy changes that would take place, almost automatically, and which would end 

successfully. In substance, this meant a considerable approximation to the West European 

countries. We easily forgot about the inherited distance, both ancient and modem, which had 

separated us Tom Western Europe. Moreover, we were not aware of the fact that, notwithstanding 

our desire to reform, we would encounter resistance from "extant matter" and be a afflicted by 

a lack of resourcesand instruments needed to effect such grand structural reforms. In another 

paper I have discussed these "shortages of transformative powers" (Wesolowski, 1992). Broadly 

put, they encompass the following factors, as specifically applied to Poland:

	1. Deficit of investment capital - primarily foreign (domestic is, by the very nature 

of the former regime, quite limited);

	2. absence of mature and stable party structures able to articulate society's wants and 

demands and produce stable cabinets;

	3. provisional constitution with unclear divisions of prerogatives between the president,

 parliament, and government;

	4. lack of dynamic, competitive and self-assertive attitudes among the population; and

	5. lack of reliable, competent and efficient state administration.

	

	When we point out the relatively bow political activitylof the society after 1989, we 

must be aware that this law level of activity has be& brought about by a combination of factors.

Among the most important was the necessity to reorient one's occupation and sources of income 

and, for many, to maintain their present employment and ward off pauperization. Almost by 

necessity, politics became less important, especially since most people believed that political

power was now in better hands than those of the communists. One could add that the transition 

to a free-market economy compelled the emergence of resourcefulness, and, indirectly, proved 

to be a victory of the liberal - individualist orientation. The everyday primacy of the 

economic sphere forced political orientations into the background.



	A parallel factor was a lack of stimuli coming from the intellectual and political 

spheres that would compel entire social groups to develop an interest in the matter of reforms 

and politics understood as their instrument. Most intellectuals appeared to believe in 

Fukuyama's claim about the "end of history"; were thus eager to consider various ways of 

pro-capitalist transformation and democratization but only within narrow limits and were 

inclined to favour "well-tried" western models (Wesolowski, 1995). Practising politicians of 

the "Solidamosc" bloc were more interested in the formation of governments than in activating 

different social groups for specific reform activities. As regards the plane of political 

action, they believed that the society would be satisfied with all-too- general declarations 

and elections every four years. Therefore they failed to build up a political infrastructure 

in local communities. Society did not force the new emerging proto-parties to develop stable 

programs and be reliable.



	Society itself produced indifferent attitudes toward politics just as the objective 

structuration of old interests was collapsing and the structuration of the new was still 

emetgtig. The "translation" of a fluid economic situation into group interests simply proved 

to be difficult. Thus society gave no stimuli to some definitive structuration of the political

scene. The personal ambitions of the politicians did not find any social "restraint". Neither 

was there any formation of channels to prove that civil society is, in a relatively transparent

manner represented by the political system (Wesolowski, 1994a and 1994b).



	Based on the above, we may formulate a general theorem that, from the beginning of the 

transformations till today, Poland is in a state of political actors' crisis: their identity, 

social role, mutual relationships. The term actors here denotes, primarily, all the actors 

organized in political parties. The claim that this is only a weakness of the emerging 

organized forms of activities proves to be less and less tenable. Seemingly, the post-communist

 party as well as the peasants' party, with their efficiency and election victories, testify 

to an ongoing normalization since associated with a stability of electoral base and efficiency

of local structures.Nevertheless, centrifugal tendencies in these parties are evident. It is 

uncertain whether merely holding power will diminish these centrifugal tendencies, and already 

there appears to be the emergence of group conflicts within them. Divergent orientations within

these two parties transcend the limits of "normal" fractions.



	The political fragmentation, especially visible in the former greater "Solidarity" bloc 

is an important fact. In contrast with the situation in Hungary and the Czech Republic , 

crystallization and stabilization of the parties and the entire political system in those 

countries is much greater than in Poland, where around 200 parties officially exist,even if 

only several get constant publicity in Hungary and the Czech Republic there are only a few. 

Since 1989, the Czech Republic has had only one prime minister. There was one change of 

cabinet in Hungary after the general election. During the period of the rule of the post-

Solidarity bloc, Poland had four cabinets and, since then, the new coalition has already 

gone on to appoint its third prime minister (namely the SLD - PSL coalition, i.e. parties 

rooted in the old regime). The right-wing and centre parties that emerged horn the Solidarity 

movement are still undergoing splits and transformations. In the last two months, three of 

those parties changed their chairmen, who then refused to comply with the resolutions to that 

effect and still claim to be their legitimate leaders.



	The post-communist party (SdRP) and their political allies grouped under SLD are so 

diverse  in terms of program orientation and ideas that this bloc comprises typical economic 

neoliberals, as well "sincere" communists of the old kind. The confusion on the Polish 

political scene has been documented by systematic opinion polls. Since 1990 up till now, even 

after the SLD and PSL victories in 1993 and 1995, over 50% of Poles say that there is no party 

which would represent their ("my") interests (CBOS, 1996).



	Excessive fragmentation programmatic astigmatism of political parties is not the only 

malady of the Polish political system. It is also accompanied by another, namely involvement 

in politics and political influence exerted by forces that do not perform primary political 

functions. We refer here to the Roman Catholic Church and the NSZZ Solidamosc trade union. 

Their political functions embrace four types of activities:

1, an attempt to achieve certain particular legislative goals;

2. support for certain parties and candidates in parliamentary and presidential

elections;

3. promotion of certain visions of man and society with a direct bearing

political programs;

4. open justification of the necessity of their own institutional influence

politics.

upon

upon

The Roman Catholic Church and NSZZ SolidamoSC trade union have well-developed

organizational structures and many militants. These two organizations

are significant forces and they penetrate the entire society much more deeply and

effectively than do the political parties.

Since these two organizations are so influential and powerful, one can raise

the question whether they would not be able to replace political parties, or

become their special substitute. This might be incompatible with the democratic

system. Solidarity appears to be gradually turning into trade union cum political

party. Solidarity trade union had its own candidates in the parhamentary elections

of 1991 and 1993. In 1995 it mobihzed enough support to overthrow the

Suchocka government (which it previously helped to install). AtIer the victory of

5

the post-communist bloc in parliamentary and presidential elections of 1993 and

1995, Solidarity is striving very hard to become the unifying centre for all anti-Communist

or non-communist parties, which in Poland are called right-wing or

centre-right parties. The "grand bloc" it is forming is dominated by confessional ,

nationalistic and populist preferences.

These attempts, however, appear to contain a certain paradox. The harder

the Solidarity trade union strives to be a major political player, the more members

it loses as a trade union. It also loses the workers' trust in its trade union

efficiency, and, as a consequence, it is losing the chance to maintain its social

importance and so to play the political role it is planning.

The Roman Catholic Church, by its very essence, cannot perform the

function of a political party. This obvious statement ought to be supplemented by

an important qualification... The Church's hierarchy does not want Christian

Democracy established in Poland, even though such a party would definitely

stand a chance of becoming a significant political force. Some analysts believe

that it would create an undesirable situation for the Hierarchy by providing too

much scope for an autonomous laity within the Church. The sheep, to use a

biblical term, could take a different path to that of the shepherds, both at the

parochial level and at the level of the Church as a whole. The reluctance of the

Hierarchy to countenance the establishment of such a party engenders

disappointment among the lay, "liberal and open", Catholics. There are some

signs of changes, however. In January 1996 The hierarchy declared to withdrow

f?om direct political support for definite parties and persons

Another matter is worth mentioning here. The Poles, though almost entirely

of Catholic persuasion, have in the last two years failed to follow the specific

political recommendations of the Church. Quite a number of Catholics voted for

the post-communist party in the 1993 elections. In the presidential election of

1995, many Catholics voted for Kwasniewski, in spite of Primate Glemp's prayer

for the victory of Walesa. In January 1996, only 30% of those eligible to vote

took part in the so-called "privatization referendum" initiated by Walesa. The

Church~ called the voters to take part in this referendum, whereas the post-communist

party displayed a lukewarm attitude. All the experts were unanimous

in their opinion that the questions were unclear. Walesa's opponents were not far

t?om the truth when they claimed that by initiating this referendum Walesa

wanted to gain support in the presidential election.

In the wake of all the above unpleasant experiences, the Church's hierarchy

has stated that they will never again take the floor on political matters which are

not directly related to theology. Sociologists claim that the low political

6

persuasiveness of the church is a symptom of the secularization brought about by

urbanization, the effects of mass-culture and contacts with the West. Others add

that it was also caused by an ever present anticlericalism. Poles are a religious

people, but they carry the virus of anticlericalism. They detest being given

detailed instructions and subjected to close control by their priests.

Having focused on the Polish situation, let us now turn the spotlight on the

different situation in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Neither trade unions nor

churches (protestant and catholic in the Czech Republic) aspire to play a role in

everyday politics. Trade unions operate in alliances with given political parties

and do not want to have greater political importance than the parties. In Poland

there are no direct links between given political parties and NSZZ SolidamoS&

since, as we have already said, the trade union wants to be a patron for many

parties ( or all of post-Solidarity parties). As a result, the political scene is

confused. One could be lead to believe that once significant social forces, such as

trade unions, are patrons of the actors on the political scene. Such situation is

conducive to a multiplication of political actors. It also sustains the antagonisms

between the small, minor league players on the political scene.

In Poland, during Walesa's term as president, there were two other foci

(apart from the Church and Solidarity) which, without defining themselves as

overtly political, exerted political influence and progressively obtained autonomy

from democratic institutions, parliamentaty supervision and control. This process

of gaining autonomy and augmenting influence took place under presidential

protection. One of these foci was the military, the other - the secret services

(Urzad Ochrony Paristwa). For instance, there was a conference of Polish

generals, which, inspired by Walesa, unconstitutionally "voted" for, a change of

the Minister of Defence at a famed dinner in the miltary training complex in

Drawsko. Possibly also inspired by Walesa, or at 'least with his permission, the

secret services conducted an clandestined investigation of the alleged links of the

prime minister (Oleksy) with a representative of Russian intelligence . The prime

.minister was under surveillance although, formally, he oversees the operation of

the secret police. The entire operation was disclosed by the President only to a

selected persons, probably with the intention of playing for some political

adventage or horsetrading a few days before the Supreme Court approval of the

results of presidental election.

The possibility of centres of influence, or even of real power, forming

outside parliament, government and the formal prerogatives of the president,

results l?om the unclear division between the state organs present in the Little

Constitution, which is merely a modification of the old communist one. This Little

Constitution, avowedly provisional in nature: makes possible an elastic

interpretation of presidential prerogatives that gives the president a nearly

exclusive right to appoint and supervise the ministers of defence, internal and

foreign affairs. The entire set of confusions and unclarities in the structures

of the organs of power, political party fragmentation, along with the the

lack of balance on the political scene between strictly political and non-political

organizations, causes a situation where real political influences may

remain opaque for a longer period.

In the overcrowded politican scene - what role the parliament plays? It is

very diffkult to give balanced assesment of its functioning. Certainly, many

unnecessary battles take place in the parliament. Repotring at lenghts

parliamentary discussions in 1990-1993 contributed to antagonizing politicians

as public personalities. However, parliament is the only stable structure in

Poland which systematically improves its statuses and guards democratic

procedures. Not all deputies are angels, not all evident misconducts on their part

ware condemned by deputy-fellows. Parliament is slow in passing necessary

new laws. There are singns of "alienation" from society's wants and desires.

People express the feelings that they are not represented by parties, ergo,

parliament. Surveys polls show rather low esteem for parliament as the public

institution. Is seems to me that many complaints may be explained by very high

expectation people invested in parliament ( as the main institution of

representative democracy). The plain truth is, however, that the Polish Sejm

functions acccording to the democratic principles And it seems that it functions

democratically to a higher degree than other political institution. Paradoxically,

what Atilla A& calls "overparliamentarization" in Central-Eastern Europe is not

the greatest denger for democratization processes in the region (Agh 1994)

s

Variety of concepts of politics

It can be assumed that, in stable political systems, there emerges a certain

dominant type of politics as an activity leading to an articulation of interests,

accumulation of political influence, winning elections, or acquiring state power.

Politics is a kind of activity which finds its culmination in the exercise of power.

In democratic systems, the exercise of power is accompanied by other kinds of

activities consisting in contesting, one' political opponents.

Obviously there are many definitions of politics. They range from those

which define it as social service aiming at the creation of common good, to those

which define it as a ruthless struggle for state power and its exercise, to those

which see the essence of politics in the art or knowledge of reaching compromise

between conflicting interests. Finally, there are definitions which emphasize the

expression of a strong personality or the ability to provide ordinary people with

leadership, vital to the existence of any community.

While conducting studies on Polish politics, during the lifetime of the 199 l-1993

Sejm, we were expecting to come across different conceptions of politics.

We also expected that the individual concepts, preferred by certain leaders would

find correlates in the perception of other socio-political phenomena. Our studies

aimed at finding typological configurations in which a given conception of

politics was involved. We interviewed prominent politicians, recommended by

their fellow-MP's as thehest parliamentarians~ Very often, this choice overlapped

with the leaders of political parties with seats in the Sejm.

I have, quite deliberately, pointed out the incompatibility of actors and the

disorder on the political scene, which results horn %agmentation and the lack of

clear, comprehensive programborientations. At best, one can discern certain lines

of thinking and estimating some problems as more important than others. One

cannot claim that the Polish scene is dominated by politics understood as an

accommodation of economic interests, or by the pattern of coalition formation

typical of consociational democracy (cf. Lijphart, 1968) or by an integrated or

polarized party system (cf. Sartori, 1976).

Currently, in Poland, when politicians are asked what politics is and what

aims they see for their political activity, they point to a wide array of plausible

activities. These are commonly associated and are described under an

undoubtedly multi-aspect concept. The different conceptions of politics are

sometimes linked to an ideological orientation (liberal, christian, nationalistic),

although they very often cut across these orientations.

9

:- .

There are, however, nearly universal motifs, not SO much in the conception

of politics, as the aims it ought to pursue in times of systemic transformation. It is

a shared belief among all politcians that we should transform the economy into a

private and market formation, and they hold that the totalitarian (or authoritarian)

system ought to be transformed into a democratic one. There are, nevertheless,

some politicians who supplement the above with one additional purpose, which,

in their mind is extremely important: namely, the elimination of all the relics of

the communist heritage. The most important feature of this heritage is

secularization, treated as a deliberate policy conducted for over 40 years. To such

politicians, the re-evangelization of Poland is, today, as important as privatization

or democratization. The aim is thus a profound transformation of the nation's

spiritual sphere. If we decide that the restricted transformation be called

modernization after the liberal model, then the extension of these tasks onto the

spiritual and moral sphere, as in the above scheme, ought to be branded

modernization associated with a return to the spiritual roots of the nation.

A similar general unanimity, and lesser differences as to details, can be

observed as regards another key aim perceived as a primary task of the

transformation. In principle, all politicians are in favor of joining the European

Union and NATO. However, they are divided into "euroenthusiasts", who would

enter the Union immediately, even at the expense of such negative phenomena as

increased unemployment and a temporary collapse in some branches of the

economy, and the "eurosceptics", who call for caution in these processes and

demand tough negotiations. There are also those, although small in number, who

are afraid of an invasion of foreign customs and patterns form the west, and who

would be inclined to put up a barrier to hold them back. Those MP's would limit

the scope of integration so as to preserve full national identity and protect the

interests of domestic industry and agriculture.

All these politicians consider politics an instrument of change or

preservation of society. The changes are powerfully emphasized: sometimes

broadly, sometimes narrowly and sometimes under the rubric of very different

conceptualizations.

A different attitude toward politics is exhibited by those leaders who are

inclined to define it as a method of action regardless of its purpose. For many,

the substantial aim of politics is, in fact, of secondary importance, while the

primary one is to gain power. In this context, the methods of gaining power are

quite important. These conceptions, articulated by those Mp's who have read

political science books, directly refer to the theorems of Macchiavelli and Max

Weber. Politics is either a game or a ferocious battle, with power being the

stakes. It is quite interesting that similar definitions of politics appear equally

often as their opposite concepts concerning the conception of the politician's

national service or service for the benefit of society. It could be that, given the

GULAG experience, conceptions of politics that would emphasize the element of

sheer power (or even violence) would not appear so often as they in fact did. This

could be given a certain explanation. Politics as a fight for power is usually

attributed to political opponents. "They are contemplating fight, while we are

contemplating reforms" - runs the refrain of the "idealists".

Another political orientation is represented by those who treat politics as

for group interests. These are the members of parties of a liberal economic

orientation and representatives of business circles and trade unions.

Characteristically, they can be found in almost all parties, among liberals, social

democrats, and Christian democrats. This conception is often connected with a

feature that is absent in Polish politics and which many MP's yearn for: the

readiness to compromise. On the whole, in Poland, on the declarative plane

everybody seeks compromise whereas on the plane of real behavior they

engage in ferocious quarrels which undermine any chance of actually

reaching a compromise. One of the most fundamental questions about the future

of Polish politics comes down to whether dreams of compromise could be

fultilled.

I shall return to this matter after I have characterized a concept of politics

which can be frequently discerned in recent times almost everywhere. It is a

conception of politics that consists in providing ordinary poeople with wise and

effective leadership. The adjective "wise" is embraced by representatives of

Christian parties, which is hardly surprising, while the adjective "effective" is

stressed by liberals and social democrats. The first conceive of leadership

personified by one leader, the second in a team of collaborating leaders.

What is more interesting, however, is that there are some politicians,

among both liberals and social democrats, who find it desirable to have

authoritarian rule in tune of transformation. In order to conduct speedy and

effective ownership transformations, some Polish liberals declared their sympathy

for "enlightened absolutism". Also, quite unexpectedly, a prominent leader of

SdRP - the post-communist party - once said "we could use some

authoritarianism". Being one of Waiesa's opponents, it is hardly plausible that he

had in mind Walesa's version of authoritarianism.

To provide a somewhat different classification of the utterances of eminent

Polish politicians, I would like to point out three conceptions of politics, which

are not always clearly identified in our material, but present only implicitly. The

II

_

first conception of politics treats it as a game with a beginning and an end; once it

is fished, the partners still exist, and the result is that one has gained something

while the other has lost something. Yet profits and losses do not necessarily

balance each other. When there are more than two partners then the protit and

loss balance is complicated and not fi~lly equalized. Jn terms of game theory, this

is a variable-sum game. Most bargains between employees and employers about

a number of parallel aims (wages, working hours, holidays) belong to this type of

game. Here also belong the bargains relevant to forming political and

government coalitions, where the final profits and losses are hard to assess in the

right proportions. These comments should be concluded as follows: Polish

liberals and social democrats have this type of policy in mind (politics as a game)

when they talk of it as a compromise.

The second type of understanding of politics is not as game but a "tight for

arsenals". The arsenals of political action are finances, the number of activists and

members, local party organizations equipped with telecommunication devices, as

well as the number of dailies, weeklies and friendly radio stations. In modem

times arsenals maybe a decisive factor for the outcome of political struggles.

Preparation for decisive political struggle very often consists in liquidating or

weakening the opponent's arsenals.

The third type is the war for annihilation of the opponent as such. This

can be metaphorically called political annihilation, as it is not about physical

killing of anybody, but the annihilation of the opponent's organization. One Polish

political leader spoke in favor of such an understanding of politics as plausible

practice. Being a political scientist himself, he could have known the writings of

Carl Schmitt and Max Weber. These two thinkers often considered politics jointly

in its external and internal dimensions. For both: the killing of the enemy of "our

nation" was morally justifed in time of war. On the basis of our interviews,

political annihilation on the domestic front could also prove morally justifiable. If

it is revolution, then it concerns physical killing of individuals: if transformation.

it may concern annihilation of politcal organizations.

In our interviews with politicians we sometimes sensed a certan affinity of

the types of political practice under consideration with the considerations on the

legitimacy of individual actors on the present political scene in Poland. If read

carefully, the casual utterances of our respondents reveal a conviction about three

kinds of political legitimization of the actors on the Polish political scene.

The leaders of Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej suggest that only they

have a full legitimization to wield power in contemporary, independent Poland.

Their party was formed in the late 1970's in the underground, and their illegally

' .

published leaflets demanded that Poland be liberated Tom Soviet domination. In

their interviews, the representatives of this party sharply divided the politcal

scene: "KPN and the rest".

The second type of legitimization is claimed by most of the opposition

which was formed as the Solidarity Bloc. It originated in the circles of the

Catholic opposition (mainly grouped around Tygodnik Powszechny, Kluby

Inteligencji Katolickiej), informal clubs of the liberal intelligentsia, or the Komitet

Obrony Robotnik6w - KOR. In their opinion, their title to power stems from

systematic work to change the social awareness in communist Poland, organizing

various forms of "small" but effective resistance at universisties against

communist indoctrination, as well as uniting the intelligentsia and workers in the

grand Solidarity movement of 1980-1981; mainly, though, by their participation

in the Round Table Talks of 1989 that resulted in the peaceful and effective

taking over of power Corn the communists by the democratic bloc.

The third type of legitimization, of a different type, is claimed by SdRP

(and its SLD coalition) and PSL - the peasant party which also existsed under the

ancien regime. This is electoral Ieigitimization. Those parties won the election of

1993, threfore, by the will of the people and the laws of majority rule, they should

form the government and construct the program for society. Yet it is additionally

a program outlined by the Solidarity bloc which claims legitimization on the basis

of a historic victory over communism. The contested problem, however, consists

in whether one should observe the electoral legitimization of the post-communists,

whose power was overthorwn by a popular revolution, and remove

from power those who were victorious in the uprising. The undisputed fact

mentioned above is the basis for many right-wing politicians, now in the minority,

who insist that the post-communist party - SdRP - ought to be delegalized, its

"neck should be broken", and a new revolution should be organized against it;

possibly also a continuation of the revoultion of the 1980's.

For those who share this belief, a mere electoral victory does not provide

the legitimization for wielding power, since the legitimacy of power must be

based on something more than the ballot. Legitimate power must be rooted in

certain socio-political philosophy; it must be grounded axiologically.

Once we become aware of the fact of the three types of politics and three

types of legitimization, the sources of the high degree of conflict in the Polish

political scene become more readily understandable. The antagonisms between

some parties are so deeply-rooted that it is very hard to overcome them,even if

the need for compromise is verbally and publicly articulated.

13

The presidential election of 1995 provided an example of how easily

antagonisms can be mobilized as a psychological weapon in politics. True, it

does not always lead to victory, but its partial effectiveness is undisputed.

Antagonism usually refers to sentiments and symbols, and not to economic

rationality. In short, one could say that Walesa, in his election campaign, tried to

divide society into the post-communists, who lacked legitimization and those who

had been wronged or underestimated in the course of the reforms - those who

were the real actors in the anti-communist revolution. A division thus constructed

did not bring him final victory, but at least revealed a temporary inclination of

Poles to accept the relative validity of the suggested division. Aleksander

KwaSniewski won by 600,000 votes out of 10 million voters. Walesa lost but

constructed the axis of antagonism.

Polarization or Consensus?

Consensus is now one of the most popular words in political science. It is

usually said that is necessary for the functioning of democracy. Higley and Burton

( 1987 and 1989 ) in their influential theory of political elites, ascribe to the

consensus the constitutive role in the emergence and maintainence of stable

democracy. Contesting parties have to reach definite settlement. Can we say that

there is a political consensus in Poland? The matter appears to be too complex

and difficulty to judge unequivocally.

I would begin by specifying four factors which, in my opinion, are

presumed in the conception of political consensus:

1. agreement reached by the previously contesting parties as to the basic features

of the political system;

2. agreement as to the issues and methods to resolve them, which would become

a common striving and action;

3. acceptance of the rules of the political game between partners, both in

conducting disputes and the methods applied to reach agreement;

3. mutual observance by the partners as being legitimate participants in

negotiations; this, however, recognises the possibility that not everyone is

always considered a legitimate partner.

The specification of these points makes us aware that consensus in a given

country and at a given time can be broader or narrower, and also deeper or

shallower. It is wider especially when more features of a political system are

accepted, more issues considered urgent and calling for common solutions, more

conrete rules of consensus and cooperation are agreed upon and given space for

practical application .

Consensus can be considered deeper, if more social partners participate in

its production, that is the partners represent a wider spectrum of classes, social

groups, ideologicai orientations and points of view. It is also deeper when there

are fewer doubts as to the social legitimization of individual partners. Moreover,

it could be considered deeper if the partners act, thoughtfL1, without getting

involved in conflicts, to solve problems the reality has posited for them.

The Polish consensus of 1989 could be defined as relatively shalow. Its

manifestations were the general agreements of the Round Table, eccompasing

many areas of like without, however, thoughtful designs for long-run changes.

The acceptance of reforms of the political and economic system in the direction

of the 6ee market 'and democracy, as well as the involvement of the elites in the

initiation of changes proved to be insufficient to accomplish quickly specific

reforms that required particular legislative actions. So the frst parliaments were

prescupied with declarations of intensions and minor amendments to existing

laws rather than a design of a new system. Even though, disagreements on

specific small issues emerged quickly and increased political conflicts that started

separating the former Solidarity bloc. We see this shalowness and lack of

decisive political action better today then in the period 1989-93. Some analysts

see this state of affairs as a neccesery price for securiting a mutual acceptance by

the partners who sat at the Round Table, and even those who did not (like KPN

or Union of Real Politics).

How can we define the present state of affairs after five years of serious

disintegrative processes on the political scene? In particular, how do we grasp

the events of the last few months, among which two seem to be particularly

significant. T'he first is the sharp division into communists and non-communists

promoted, above all, by WalGsa, in his election campaign. If we treat seriously

the cutting words of many leaders who defined themselves as declared

anticommunists, then what we have in Poland is a phenomenon of polarization

(in %-tori's terms).In Sartori's model a sign of polarization is that the opponents

opted for different general economic and poIiticaI systems. For instance, in Italy

in the Togliatti times some political parties opted for capitalism, some for

socialism (the Communist Party of Italy). In Poland during the presidential

election campaign of 1995 postcommunist party was publicly accused of a

willingness to restore "socialism" and of having the political motivation of making

the communist party a class bent on taking over national property via qusi-technocratic

management of economy. They were also accused of taking over all

organs of political power, and trying to restore their entire domination of the past.

The new domination, according to this predictions, is looming on the horizon.

These predictions are, in part, justified by the tendencies displayed by

SLD and PSL to take over some already privatized companies, the most inflential

position in the privatizing agencies and board of directors in those companies that

will have mixed capital (state-owned and private) soon, and taking over the most

influential posts in local and central administration Therefore the post-Solidarity

parties do not perceive them as trustworthy. Voices are also heard demanding

the withdrawal of their political legitimization.

The situation is even more complicated in the scattered post-Solidarity

bloc, Some parties accuse others of secret contacts with the communists and thus

these parties somehow lose their legitimization. On top of that, leaders accuse

one another of a complete lack of understanding of what "good" ways and

methods shouId be chosen for the development of the economy or the politica

system. It is worth noting that in January, Walcsa invited all the leaders of the

post-Solidarity bloc to a meeting so as to discuss a common anti-communist

strategy. The leaders turned the invitation down because they did not want to

make Walesa the commander of the whole bloc. The current attempts to reunite

the anti-communist right-wing parties by many tactical alliances are not very

successful. Popular reactions to such alliances are hardly to be predicted. The

public stays sceptical.

The phenomenon of 'YefUsing to meet" is an important indicator for any

verdict about consensus; in the Polish case it is a negative one. In this context,

one more fact has to be mentioned, namely the difficulties to meet by those who

participated in the Round Table talks - the old-time communists and the former

Solidarity opposition leaders. Shortly before leaving office, Walesa initiated

referendum on the "popular privatization" scheme. After a debate in parliament

the referendum took the form of five not-to-clear questions. The referendum

turned out to be invalid because less than 50% of eligible voters participated. In

order to decide what to do next, President KwaSniewski invited the leaders of all

significant parties to a conference. However, they did not turn up, but sent their

technical experts. Beyond doubt, this response was a slap in the face for the

President and a clear sign of some parties ' reluctant attitude toward consensus.

The above illustration prove how difficult it is for politicians of different

orientations to meet; especially for those politicians who belong to two opposite

16

camps: the post-communist and the post-Solidarity leaders. Without meetings, to

talk of consensus is meaningless.

At the same tune, however, one may ask whether consensus can exist

without meetings between the political leaders. This is the problem posited by

the contemporary Polish experience. Such consensus obviously cannot be

considered deep or broad. It is definitely unstable and easy to upset. It also

provides conditions for an erosion of the ground on which stable consensus could

be built. What could, therefore, be a manifestation of such consensus without

meetings?

It must be said that, at present, there are no such parties or political centres

that would not in fact accept the road to an economy based on private ownership

and a democracy as broad as possible. Moreover, in the last two years the

acceptance of a prompt integration with Western Europe has been growing

steadily, even by its previous opponents. There is unanimity as to joining NATO.

One can say that there is aaeement as to the basic systemic contours of the

state and the rules of economic and social order. There is also agreement as to

foreign policy interests, on which international alliances should be built. Even

when these matters are discussed only in everyday and pra_matic terms without

referring to the entire philosophy of European unity, these are, nevertheless.

important dimensions of a nationwide consensus.

Can we speak of consensus in two fundamental matters when there are

important differences as to three other important issues? Maybe it is a broken

consensus? Or maybe it is a consensus entangled in historical diversions? The

lines of division are the following: the attitude toward rehgron and atheism.

toward communism and the heritage of the PRL, as well as toward self-government

and centralization.

Here is a handful of examples. Can we stop the heated debates on abortion,

on the manner of religious and lay ethical education in schools, incessant

accusations in the media clericalism or, to the contrary, libertinism and atheism'?

Can we reach agreement as to the so-called decommztniration check (the Polish

term lustracja - lustration), or as to the punishment for those who initiated and

conducted staged political trials and introduced brutal methods of treating

political prisoners? Will we have consent as to the degree of

centralization/decentralization of state power'?

As regards the last issue, Poles differ in a manner which is confusing and

their motives are hardly discernible. One specificity that is worth mentioning here

is that as regards decentralization. there are more serious differences between the

peasant and the post-communist party (now coalition partners), than between the

17

post-communist party and Unia Wolnosci (Liberty Union, former Democratic

Party fused with former Liberal Democratic Congress) Liberty Union is, possibly,

the most typical representation of the political Solidarity movement of the 1980's.

Contemporary details from contemporary Polish history must make us

aware that consensus is a graded phenomenon. What is more important, however,

during the post-communist transformation, at least in some countries, is that the

process of transferring power by the communists into the hands of the democrats

can be annulled by a number of strictly political conflicts. The question I

formulated in another paper was: is it possible to preserve democracy without

consensus? It is quite plausible that a democratic majority and coexistence with

the opposition would be sufficient. I believe that we must reconsider the

following issue: majority rule and consensus. This should be connected with the

issue of political legitimization of the majority.

The Polish example shows that the type of morally grounded and

'historically meritorious" legitimization does not necessarily overlap with

majority legitimization. Moral-historical legitimation of the Solidarity-rooted

parties seems to belong to "another reality" than legal-procedural , electoral

legitimization of the postcommunist party. Moreover, in Poland, this situation is

coflict ridden. The paradox consists in the fact that communists, the guardians of

the authoritarian (in some aspects totalitarian) regime, destined to be distroyed by

the revolution, have been emerging as a victorious force under democratic

regime.

When we look at the variety of Polish specificities, we can say that more

chances of conflict and dangers for consensus can be found on the political scene

than among the members of the society. Most people are more ready to embrace

consensus than are the politicians. Certainly, Poles do notice the growing social

differentiation and many are dissatisfied with this. The workers employed in

factories and mines that are threatened with liquidation go on strike, petty farmers

are afraid of the future and are inclined to support some demagogues. Among the

intelligentsia there are some debates on the shape of democracy ( mostly on the

great prerogatives for the President or Prime Minister) but they do not take sharp

forms. The majority of society is working, accepting market reforms, and in

everyday life cooperates in solving local problems. It does not demand that the

politicians carry out an unrelenting revolution or a sentimental return to the PRL.

Generally speaking, society is much more peaceful than the politicians.

This last statement indicates a large social indeterminism as to the events

on the political scene .This scene can develop its own conflictual dynamics, and,

to some extent, can extend to the whole society. I did not discuss in this paper the

18

results of research concerning the politicians' perception of social divisions. I

must add one more thing here. The politicians display a clear tendency to carry

over the political differences onto their picture of society. For many of them,

ideological divisions are worth mentioning and emphasizing, while economic

division often escape their attention. Such a political bias appeared as the answer

to this question: what significant divisions do you see in our society? ( Gortat ,

1995 ) Ironically speaking, there is a lack of consensus between the political

elite and society as to the perception of the most vital problems and the

pressing demands of the newly forming society.

The above quoted example can testify to the growing autonomy of the

economic and political spheres. Obviously, it would be a wrong conclusion to say

about separation of them, as in time of transformation, the mutual dependency

between the economy and politics is enormous and multifold.

The purpose of my analysis, above all, has been to show the dependencies

that could appear on the purely political plane. Three spheres of phenomena call

for a logical connection here:

dominant understanding of politics at a given time and in a given place;

the identification of various kinds of meanings attributed to legitimization,

both in the political elite and the society at large;

the differentiation between the numerous aspects of consensus, as well as their

possible configurations and the gradation of "consent".

The dangers for the democratic transition can be located in an unhappy

combination of these three tendencies: an enduring disagreement on what politics

is about ("politics as political killing" prevails over politics as the accomodation

of interests) lack of agreement on the "standards" of legitimacy, the very nerrow

consensus, limited to the selected features of international policy (raison d'etat)

or even lack of this. The actual combination/gradation of the three elements in

each particular country I consider very important aspect of any analysis of

political transition to democracy. In this respect, different experiences of Central-East

European countries seem to me worth studying.

I would like to stress one thing : it is not true that politics has one

unchangeable "essence" in every country and in every period. The common

practice of politicians in a given country defines the content of politics by their

actions, whether as accommodation of interests or, conversely, as political

annihilation). Politics is what politicians really do, regardless of the efforts

made by scientists to build a universal definition. The period of transformation in

Poland is, among others, transitory as it has not produced a dominant type of

understanding of politics and political practice.

I9

Nevertheless. transition has produced a certain relationship behveen the

understanding of politics and legitimization. The politics of compromise has its

affinity with legitimization understood in the Weberian sense as legal-rational,

which in democratic systems is based on elections and plurality of

organized actors. Such a notion of politics and legitimization normally has its

counterpart in a limited ran_re of commonly accepted solutions

However,legitimacy linked to such a procedural understanding must be rather

strong and broad as far as acceptance of partners is concerned. If any of the

potential partners is categorized as unacceptable and thus ineligible for

negotiations, this engenders a polarization of the political system.

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