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Basic Information on the
Bomb
Source: The Enola Gay
Exhibit (no longer online) 8/11/98.
Between 1937 and 1941 Japan conquered and occupied most of East and
Southeast Asia. In December 1941 Japan attacked the US Navy in Pearl
Harbor, prompting US entry into the war and widening the scope of the conflict.
However, the Japanese had limited resources for a lengthy war, especially
as the US and Britain began pushing the Japanese out of East and Southeast
Asia.
US scientists successfully tested the first atomic bomb in the New Mexico
desert on July 16, 1945, while President Truman was meeting with Stalin and
Churchill at Potsdam. The allies issued the Potsdam Declaration calling
upon Japan to surrender or suffer “the utter devastation of the Japanese
homeland” and concluding with a call for the Japanese government “to proclaim
now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces” (T. E. Vadney,
The World Since 1945, p. 44). This reiterated the call for Japan’s
unconditional surrender first issued in 1943. By the time of the Potsdam
Declaration, Truman had already ordered the US Air Force to use the bomb
as soon as possible after August 3. The first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima
August 6; the Soviets declared war on Japan August 8; and a second bomb was
dropped on Nagasaki August 9. The Japanese notified the US of their
intention to surrender on August 10, initial papers were signed August 15,
and the formal surrender ceremony took place September 2. Even after
both bombs were dropped, “unconditional surrender” was not obtained because
the Japanese Emperor was allowed to maintain his throne, the main issue of
contention for the Japanese.
Howard Zinn criticizes Truman’s decision to drop the bombs, arguing that
the main reason he did so was to keep the Russians out of Japan. At
the Yalta Conference the Soviet Union agreed to invade Japan no later than
three months after the end of the war in Europe. The war in Europe
ended on May 9, 1945, and the US dropped the first bomb on August 6, 1945,
according to Zinn, because they wanted to end it before the Soviets entered.
Otherwise, the US might have to share the postwar occupation of Japan with
the Soviet Union, as in Germany and Korea. Zinn, A People’s History
of the United States.
SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION
The firebombing campaign, which began in earnest
with the great raid against Tokyo on the night of March 9-10, proved far
more devastating than expected. During the next five months, [US Air Force
Secretary] LeMay's bombers razed one half of the total area of 66 cities—burning
178 square miles. By the summer of 1945, Japan's productive capacity
had been lowered as follows: power generation by 50 percent, oil by
85 percent, and overall industrial production by 60 percent. The destruction
was so complete LeMay warned his superiors he would run out of targets by
September.
JAPAN SEEKS A NEGOTIATED PEACE
On April 5, l945, one week before Roosevelt's death,
Japanese Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso and his cabinet resigned because of
the increasingly disastrous course of the war—the second such resignation
in less than a year. A peace faction in the military-dominated Japanese
government had begun to realize that a way had to be found to negotiate an
end to the war. The Allied demand for "unconditional surrender " was, however,
regarded as intolerable.
THE EMPEROR AND "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER"
A key obstacle to any Japanese surrender was the
Emperor's position. To the Japanese warlords, the Allied demand for unconditional
surrender meant the total destruction of their political system, including
a "divine" monarchy that had survived for more than a thousand years.
To most Americans, [Emperor] Hirohito was a hated symbol of Japanese military
aggression. Many wanted him executed, or at least imprisoned or exiled. Undersecretary
of State Joseph Grew nonetheless argued that the Japanese might surrender
if allowed to retain their Emperor. He also asserted that the Emperor would
be "the sole stabilizing force" capable of making the Japanese armed forces
accept a surrender order.
WE COULD
NOT GIVE ANY WARNING
This passage [from the official minutes of the
Interim Committee meeting of May 31, 1945] gives the committee's recommendation
regarding the use of the bomb:
Secretary [Stimson] expressed the conclusion, on which there
was general agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any
warning, that we could not concentrate on a civilian area;
but that we should seek to make a profound psychological
impression on as many inhabitants as possible. … [T]he Secretary
agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant
employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by
workers' houses.
INVASION OF JAPAN—AT WHAT COST ?
Estimates of the number of American casualties—dead,
wounded, and missing—that the planned invasion of Japan would have cost
varied greatly. In a June 18, 1945, meeting, General Marshall told President
Truman that the first 30 days of the invasion of Kyushu could result in 31,000
casualties. But Admiral Leahy pointed out that the huge invasion force could
sustain losses proportional to those on Okinawa, making the operation much
more costly. Had the Kyushu invasion failed to force Japan to surrender,
the United States planned to invade the main island of Honshu, with the goal
of capturing Tokyo. Losses would have escalated.
After the war, Truman often said that the invasion
of Japan could have cost half a million or a million American casualties.
The origin of these figures is uncertain, but Truman knew that Japan had
some two million troops defending the home islands. He believed, along
with the many Americans who would have had to invade Japan, that such a campaign
might have become, in his words from June 18, 1945, "an Okinawa from one end
of Japan to the other." Added to the American losses would have been
several times as many Japanese casualties—military and civilian. The
Allies and Asian countries occupied by Japan would also have lost many additional
lives. For Truman, even the lowest of the casualty estimates was unacceptable.
To prevent an invasion and to save as many lives as possible, he chose to
use the atomic bomb.
WAS AN
INVASION INEVITABLE WITHOUT THE BOMB?
President Truman believed that an invasion of Japan
would be necessary if the atomic bomb did not work. In hindsight, however,
some have questioned whether an invasion was inevitable. Based on information
available after the war, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded in 1946
that, "Certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to
1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had
not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no
invasion had been planned or contemplated." The U.S. naval blockade
was strangling Japan, which depended totally on imported fuel, while conventional
bombing was destroying its infrastructure.
However, other postwar observers, including Secretary
Stimson, doubted that Japan's rulers would have accepted unconditional surrender
if the home islands had not been invaded or if the atomic bomb had not been
dropped. In any case, many American lives would have been lost by November
1, 1945, and after that date, the invasion of Kyushu would have been in full
swing.
THE ORIGIN OF JAPANESE KAMIKAZES
After a devastating defeat in the three-day battle of Leyte Gulf in October
1944, Japanese leaders introduced a new weapon: kamikaze or suicide
pilots. The word kamikaze literally means "divine wind" after
a typhoon in the 13th century that kept Kublai Khan's invading forces at
bay. Author Daniel Yergin says that Kamikaze pilots "were meant
to be the ultimate embodiment of the Japanese spirit, inspiring all their
compatriots to total sacrifice. But," he further points out, "they
also served a very practical purpose for a country extremely short of oil,
planes, and skilled pilots. ... Not only was the pilot sure to cause more
damage if he crashed his plane, not only would his commitment and willingness
to die unnerve an enemy who could not comprehend the mentality of such an
act, but--since he was not going to return--his fuel requirement was cut in
half." Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The EpicQuest for Oil, Money
& Power, p. 362.